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Evaluating Deceased Organ Donation: A Programme Theory Approach 
Introduction 
 
The worldwide demand for donated organs and tissues has grown substantially, driven by 
the steady addition of new organs to transplantation repertoire. The first successful corneal 
transplantation is now over a century away (1906), subsequent opportunities arriving 
spasmodically (kidney, 1954) and then latterly at a faster pace (liver, heart, pancreas, lung, 
intestines, hand, face, etc). Technical innovations automatically generate increasing demand 
but supply remains a problem resulting in yet further health service waiting lists. Advances 
in donation numbers have been halting and securing more organs for transplantation 
presents a major health challenge. This quest has met with considerable variation across 
continents, countries and regions.  ‘League tables ? of high and low performers abound in the 
professional and popular literature, as do explanations for relative success or failure 
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2004; Abadie and Gay, 2006). Spain is customarily positioned as the 
clear world leader in the donation league tables, with UK, Germany and Sweden bringing up 
the rear. To date, research has struggled to understand these disparities and the reasons 
behind them and major policy modifications seem unable to overcome them. 
Although quite unique in its procedures and practicalities, deceased organ donation shares 
in the complexities experienced in the delivery of all services in modern medicine. The 
ultimate outcome (transplantation) requires the coordinated effort of hundreds of players 
(patients, donors, recipients, families, physicians and surgical teams from assorted 
departments and institutions), often operating with different motivations and objectives. 
Understanding the requisite processes and interactions has drawn on conceptual schemas 
extracted from clinical, management, social science and public health theories (Steiner, 
2008). For all these reasons we are confronted with a prime example of a complex adaptive 
system in health care (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001). Multiple, self-adjusting, unpredictable 
and interacting pathways operate in the death-to-donation-to-transplantation process.  
This methodological paper offers an initial framework for evaluating the effectiveness of 
ƚƌĂŶƐƉůĂŶƚĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ?KƵƌĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐďĂƐĞĚŝŶĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŬŶŽǁĂƐ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ
theoƌǇĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ that is commonplace in the study of social interventions 
(Chen and Rossi, 1980; Coryn et al., 2010) but less widely used in bio-medical evaluation 
(Pawson and Sridharan, 2010; Funnell and Rogers, 2011). This approach is also known as 
 ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇ-ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ?ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?Atsbury and Leeuw, 2010; Donaldson, 2007; 
Leeuw, 2003; Rogers et al., 2000; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Weiss, 1995, 1997). Put simply, 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĚĞƐŝŐŶƐďĞŐŝŶďǇĞůŝĐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƐ ?ƚŚĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƚŚĂƚ
has gone into the making of an intervention and then move to a period of sustained 
empirical investigation whose purpose is to gauge the extent to which the theories are met 
in practice. In complex systems, all manner of practical flows, blockages, inconsistencies and 
insynchronicities will confront the programme theory. The research builds up a picture of 
how these contingent forces shape the effectiveness of an intervention, which can then be 
fed back to practitioners in order to help improve their service.  
More specifically, programme theories are the sets of ideas and assumptions, which 
professionals and practitioners use in the planning and execution of interventions. The 
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programme theory spells out the coordinated sequence of activities A, B, C, etc. that are 
thought to be necessary in achieving the programme goal Z. The evaluative component lies 
in a process of electing and mapping the ideas that have gone into the making of an 
intervention (Leeuw, 2003; McLaughlin and Jordan, 2004) and then going on to test 
empirically how the ideas are put into practice and whether they are sufficient to achieve 
the intended outcomes. The tests of programme theories normally requires a multi-method 
evidence base (quantitative, qualitative, comparative, documentary, etc) and have the aim 
ŽĨƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ ‘ůĂƚĞƌĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?ĨŽƌĂƚŚĞŽƌǇƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ all-conclusive 
 ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ? ?WĂǁƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
We build on this strategy in three ways. The first part of the paper uncovers the stunning 
complexity of the programme logistics that are involved in donation and transplantation 
services.  It turns out that the process is not as simple as A, B, C but has an iterative, 
recursive structure involving the coordination of a multiplicity of stakeholders with different 
and sometimes competing interests. The second part of the paper contrasts the subtleties 
ĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĚƌĂŵĂŽĨĚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝŶgle-ůĞǀĞƌ ?and 
 ‘ŶƵĚŐĞ ?ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƌĞĐĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞh<ĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁƚŽ
overcome the donation shortfall. Many contemporary policy recommendations suggest a 
reform of parts of the donation regime without considering their place in or effect upon the 
whole system. The final section is a more speculative piece indicating how the programme 
theory approach might be used to improve the design and implementation of donation 
services. Programme theories can act as: ŝ ?Ă ‘ĚƌŝůůŝŶŐƌŝŐ ?ĂůůŽwing us to penetrate down the 
micro-ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŝ ?Ă ‘ďƌŝĚŐĞŚĞĂĚ ?ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
construction of cross-national comparisons that allow us the tease out the elements of best 
practice.  
1. Organ Donation and Transplantation as a Complex Adaptive System 
 
A complex adaptive system is a collection of individual agents with freedom to act in ways 
that are not always totally predictable, and whose actions are interconnected so that the 
action of one part changes the context for other agents (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001). The 
dynamics of these multiple, diverse and interconnected elements imbue any attempt to 
change the system with significant unpredictability. In complex, open systems like the 
donation/transplantation process, any innovation must be understood as an adaptation to a 
system rather than a novel treatment aimed at a fresh outcome. To predict and test the 
ĞĨĨŝĐĂĐǇŽĨĂŶ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? targeted at one aspect of the system requires knowledge of 
the whole system.  
To illustrate the point, Figure 1 shows a basic programme theory of the steps needed for a 
successful death-to-donation-to-transplantation regime within acute hospitals. dŚŝƐ ‘ůŽŐŝĐ
ŵĂƉ ?ǁĂƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚŝŶĂƐĐŽƉŝŶŐ study, which involved dialogue with key stakeholders 
(national and local procurement organisations, donor and recipient charities, healthcare 
staff, members of the public, etc) in the UK and Spain, and a synthesis of core planning and 
service delivery documentation. Like all  ‘ŝĚĞĂů-type ? models it is itself a simplification 
(Weber, 1949).  Its purpose is to highlight and accentuate the number of steps needed to 
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achieve the anticipated changes, the relationships among them and how these facilitate or 
hinder progress. Later in the paper we will add various overlaps and non-linearities, as well 
as providing more detail in showing how each step is a complex system in itself.  
Our immediate aim is to describe, at first approximation, the intricacies of the organ 
donation implementation chain in order to show that improvement of the whole depends 
on a close understanding of the parts. The coordination of the parts is the key and, in this 
respect it is interesting to note that in most countries ĂĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐƉůĂŶƚĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŽƌ ?
has become part of best practice for overseeing the project from screening to organ 
retrieval. This model commences in the hospital and sets aside, for the moment, pre-
existing public attitudes to donation and prior social marketing efforts to influence them.   
[Figure 1 about here]  
1. The donation process in hospitals has as clinical point of origin when patients enter the 
institution with a devastating brain injury and they are maintained on a ventilator. When 
patients are comatose, they require artificial ventilation and they have unresponsive dilated 
pupils, it is deduced that brain death is likely. If the patient is confirmed brain dead, 
donation after brain death (DBD) could be organised. If the patient is not brain dead yet but 
his/her injuries are non-survivable, donation after circulatory death (DCD) will be under 
consideration. Significant antecedents thus need to be in place before the donation teams 
appear in the process and DBD and DCD encounter a distinct set of operational (NHS Blood 
and Transplant, 2010), legal (Lock and Crowley-Makota, 2008) and ethical challenges 
(Manara et al., 2012). All of these decisions are complex and many-sided and are made by 
different combinations of staff acting in different hospital locations. Making a diagnosis of 
brain death is not straightforward and perceptions and definitions continue to be contested. 
For instance, brain death was only legally recognised as end of human life in Japan in 1997 
and DCD is unlawful in Germany. In short and from the beginning, a complex calculation 
ensues on what is in the best interest of the patient and best practice in preserving the 
organs.   
2. Donors with poor prognosis of survival, by whatever route, then need to be admitted into 
intensive care units for assessment and organ maintenance. It is the task of professionals in 
intensive care units, wards and emergency rooms to acknowledge and verify the presence 
of a potential donor but the availability of intensive care beds is also at stake. Donor 
detection and referral is, therefore, the second step in our model, itself significant in 
determining how many families are subsequently approached by hospital staff to consider 
donation. The calculation is once again complex and driven by immediate contingencies and 
local circumstances. For instance, intensive care practitioners working in institutions with 
low bed capacity, as in some UK hospitals, might not admit patients with a poor prognosis in 
favour of patients more likely to benefit from intensive care (Fabre et al., 2010). 
3. Once a potential donor is identified and housed, stage three is to determine suitability for 
donation through a process of donor assessment. This consists of a thorough medical and 
social history, physical examination, serologic testing, etc. Physicians not only decide who 
should receive organs but have a complex calculation to make on who can donate them. 
The standards adopted and actual practices vary considerably across countries but donor 
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eligibility criteria are based essentially on age and medical history. Expanding the donor pool 
is a fast moving science with older individuals and those with co-morbidities and infections 
now being accepted as donors (Lopez-Navidad and Caballero, 2003; Caballero et al., 2012a).  
4. Stage four represents the pivot of the mode  W the need to establish consent for organ 
donation. In terms of decision-making, it is the most complex component, involving as it 
does a balancing act of the wishes and expectations of a variety of stakeholders. We 
produce a separate model of the micro-processes involved later in the paper. Here we note 
the key dynamic. Wishes to donate may have been clearly expressed by patients but 
frequently this is not the case and families normally act ŝŶƉƌŽǆǇƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
wishes. Families are thus confronted with the dilemma of whether to consent or to refuse to 
donation in an enormously tragic moment. Decision making is febrile under these 
circumstances  W sudden death, violent death, age of the patient, cultural practices, parental 
involvement, kinship relationship of the decision maker are amongst the many factors 
conditioning the consent/refusal rate (Moraes et al., 2009). 
5. Next is donor maintenance, the challenge here demonstrating clearly the overlap and 
interdependence of the stages. The problem of perishability drives the donation process as 
it does with blood donation (Titmuss, 1971). Time constraints (around 72 hours from brain 
death to extraction) restrict both donation and consent procedures. They limit the period in 
which healthcare professionals have to reach and speak with relatives and also the time that 
families have to achieve an agreement on following the patient ?Ɛ wishes. Organs that cannot 
be stored using cryogenicisation have to be transplanted promptly after removal for them 
to retain their functional qualities. This period is variable (approximately 40 hours for a 
kidney, four hours for a heart, etc) but as a general rule, the shorter the amount of time, the 
better the outcomes. Other body parts like corneas, skin and other tissues, can be stored 
allowing for lapse between removal and transplantation. DCD is a procedure which is less 
predictable and has been argued to face more hazards in preserving some organs than DBD 
because some organs have a lower tolerance for warm ischemia than others.  
6-11. The process then moves to transplantation proper (stages six to eleven in the model). 
Although allocation and transplantation complexities are not the focus of this paper, a 
further brief summary follows to demonstrate that successful donations do not always 
convert into successful transplantations. Organ allocation systems are sustained by a 
national registry for organ matching and selection criteria (who gets on to the transplant 
list) and allocation policies (who is prioritised to receive organs) are decided according to 
geographical and clinical principles. Distribution policies follow diverse demand 
management models (based upon need and/or outcome) which they are supposed to 
ensure equity of access, justice and fairness (Neuberger, 2012). The whole process  W from 
allocation to removal to implantation into the multiple recipients  W often takes less than a 
few hours and this is another key to reform and evaluation. Coordination of donation and 
retrieval must be carried out in emergency conditions and logistical planning is at an 
essence. In most cases, several organs are removed and this must be done in sequentially to 
minimise their susceptibility to warm ischemic damage. Several surgical teams for heart, 
lung, and abdominal organs  W often from different institutions  W need to be carefully 
coordinated. Furthermore, donor and recipient systems need to be synchronised. For some 
organs (heart and lungs) the recipient operation often commences prior to the arrival of the 
organ at the recipient institution. After organs are recovered, they need to be preserved and 
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protected from damage before they can be transported. Some organs stay within the same 
institution and others are transported nationally or internationally (European Commission, 
2003) and by land or air requiring assistance from the police, ambulance services and airline 
companies.  
To summarise, one can say that the material and human resources required, all of which 
have to be mobilised at short notice and executed with great speed, are evidence of the 
 ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? of organ donation (Steiner, 2008).  Figure 1 demonstrates that organ 
donation is deeply embedded in an institutional context and gives a first indication of why 
rates of donation and transplantation rates vary so widely across hospitals, districts, regions 
and nations.  
2. Policies designed to improve donation rates ʹ an ex-ante assessment 
 
We now move to a critical consideration of two policies designed to tackle the problem of 
low donation rates. Once again we call on a programme theory approach and use logic maps 
ƚŽůŽĐĂƚĞƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƌĞĨŽƌŵƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?ƚŚƵƐŐĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
likely reach and potential impact. To understand these policies we need to introduce a 
second logic model to our inquiry (See Figure 2) ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚďĞƚĞƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ
ƉĂƚŚǁĂǇ ? ? 
dŚŝƐŝƐĂŵƵĐŚůĞƐƐƚĂŶŐŝďůĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ŽƌŐĂŶƉĂƚŚǁĂǇ ?ďƵƚĞƋƵĂůůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ to 
outcomes. The inclination of individuals to donate passes through stages reflecting 
increasing levels of commitment (Guadagnoly et al., 1999). 1) Some potential donors (often 
younger individuals) will have spared not a thought to donation. 2) Some will have broadly 
supportive values but never move beyond tacit approval. 3) Some will have transformed 
inclination into explicit consent. It is this mix of volitions that faces organ donation services 
and formal systems of registration can only ever measure the extent and maturity of 
 ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇ ?tŚĂƚĨŽůůŽǁƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂŶĚǁŚĂƚĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂƉƉĞŶƐŶĞǆƚŝƐ
thus, 4) the family interview. At this point the consent pathway loops back on itself in a 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĨĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶĚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŽƌ
 ‘ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ?ƚŚĞǁŝƐŚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?dŚĞŝŶĐůŝ ĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĚŽŶĂƚĞŝƐůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇƌĞƚĞƐƚĞĚ ? ? ?
often in tŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĨŽƌŵĂůůǇƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚďĞůŝĞĨƐ ? 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The junction where these two pathways collide is a crucial phase; it is a meeting point of the 
ambiguous legal framework, the painful situation in which the family suddenly finds itself, 
the unvocalised preference of the donor and the different organisational structures and 
transplant regimes. Personal decisions on donation may be rendered less decisive because 
of the paramount role of the family interview. The urgency of decision making in the 
hospital setting has a tendency to shift control into the hands of the immediate decision 
makers. Historical choices and inclinations are not ignored or overridden but mediated by 
relatives. The two logic models (organ and consent pathways) give a first indication of why 
donation and transplantation rates vary so widely. The models give a first indication that 
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there are no magic bullet solutions to bettering donation services and signal that the task of 
improving conversion rates depends on close scrutiny of every constituent micro-process.  
With this premise in mind, we move on to appraise two contemporary interventions, much 
vaunted in their claims to increase ĚŽŶĂƚĞĚĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚŽƌŐĂŶƐ P ‘presumed ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞĚĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ĨŽƌŽƌŐĂŶĚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞƚǁŽĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐĂƌĞĐŚŽƐĞŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞ
become clear policy drivers in the UK in recent years.  The need to reduce waiting lists 
through increasing the number of donors has become a priority in the NHS Organ Donation 
and Transplantation Directorate. In 2006, the Government set up the Organ Donation 
Taskforce to identify barriers to organ donation and recommend actions needed to increase 
organ donation and transplantation. In 2008, they made 14 recommendations proposing 
significant changes in existing systems (Department of Health, 2008a). They also produced a 
review of the potential impact of changing the legislative system over consent for organ 
donation in the UK (Department of Health, 2008b). In 2011, they published a final report, 
describing progress made towards their challenge to increase organ donation by at least 
50% by 2013 (Department of Health, 2011). 
Our appraisal provides a rapid ex-ante assessment using secondary data from other contexts 
in which the same programme theories have been applied previously.  
 
I. Presumed consent and opting out 
 
In 2011, the Welsh Government published a White Paper to introduce a  ‘soft opt-out ? 
system of organ donation, meaning that unless an individual opts out explicitly, it is 
 ‘ƉƌĞƐƵŵĞĚ ? that their organs and tissues will be available for donation. The soft approach 
means that individuals will have a formal mechanism for registering objection and relatives 
will be involved in the decision (Welsh Government, 2011). Presumed consent policies are 
ŶŽƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĞǀĞƌǇǁŚĞƌĞ ?dŚĞŬĞǇŐƌĂĚĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?ŚĂƌĚ ?to 
 ‘ǁĞĂŬ ?ƐŽĨƚ ?, referring to the level of family consultation. Studies aggregating international 
data  W with few exceptions  W often neglect to consider this implementation gradation and 
tend to make comparisons based on the broad legislative requirement, namely whether 
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚŽƌ ‘presumed ? consent. In practice there is always subtle operational and 
bureaucratic blurring of the difference. For instance, Spain registers wishes to donate but it 
does not consult them and it does not provide its population with a formal tool to record 
wishes not to donate. 
 
Against this background, a heated debate has followed about the merits of presumed versus 
informed consent. Countries with high donation rates apparently share a common 
denominator: namely, presumed consent legislation under which all deceased persons are 
considered potential donors in absence of explicit opposition before death. By contrast, in 
the UK, one of several countries (US, Australia, Germany) under informed consent 
legislation, donations are not only low but in 40% of cases relatives do not consent to 
donation (Department of Health, 2008a). Powerful lobbyists have assembled under each 
banner. At the time of writing, the British Medical Association supports presumed consent 
and the NHS Organ Donation Taskforce opposes it. The Royal College of Surgeons, the 
British Transplant Society and the Royal College of Pathologists also prefers a system of 
presumed consent and the Royal College of Nursing removed its opposition to presumed 
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consent in 2008 (British Medical Association, 2009). In 2008, the Organ Donation Taskforce 
reviewed international evidence on donations and concluded that donation rates cannot be 
successfully improved with legislation change and that efforts were to be concentrated in 
better infrastructure and resources (Department of Health, 2008a; 2011). This UK debate 
extends to the international research literature with studies offering contradictory data to 
whether presumed consent countries produce significantly higher organ donation rates 
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2004; Abadie and Gay, 2006; Rhitalia, et al., 2009). 
 
Much of the confusion here, we submit, stems from ambiguity over what it means to 
 ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ? to organ donation before death. People may communicate their preferences 
explicitly or implicitly.  ‘ǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ? includes joining the official registry, carrying a donor card, or 
using other written materials to express wishes (e.g. wills, advanced directives, etc). Explicit 
consent is thereby considered to signal a clear donation preference to family members who 
ǁŝůůŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇďĞĂƐŬĞĚĂďŽƵƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƐŚĞƐ. However, cards and registers do 
not always carry legal status and their stipulations are not enforced in most countries. 
Physicians have also questioned whether they represent ĂƌĞĂů ‘ŵĞĚŝĐĂůŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ? 
in the sense of fully understanding the consequences of the decision (treatment that is not 
in their best interest, etc). Practicalities of finding donor cards when patients are in A&E and 
accessing donor registers are also at stake.  Donor register consultation does not always 
occur (Van Leiden et al., 2010) and effectiveness of donor databases is contingent to 
significant factors common to any computerised data management system: Errors 
associated with pulling data together from many sources  (Department of Health, 2010); 
software errors when the database is used as an operational tool; poor data quality and 
accuracy of information like out-of-date address information, incomplete donor 
identification details -a key factor in countries like the UK with no ID cards-, etc.  
 
Explicit wishes in verbal form may also occur but they are more difficult to trace and more 
likely to be disputed within some families. In short, informed consent programmes allow 
individuals with strong preferences for donation to state their wishes but do not guarantee 
that these will be fulfilled. There is a parallel and potentially greater ambiguity about the 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?. Inaction, of course, may signal everything from intolerance to 
apathy to forgetfulness. It has been argued, however, that families confronting this 
unknown intention infer that non-registered relatives are not active supporters of donation 
and, accordingly, do not consent on their behalf (Bilgel, 2012). Under such an interpretation, 
the registers may become an unintended mechanism that acts to reduce donation numbers 
for those (the majority of the population) who do not formally record their wishes. We can 
call on programme theory to trace these indeterminacies through the system. Figure 3 
shows the logic map of informed consent. Once a donor is identified, the individuaů ?ƐǁŝƐŚĞƐ
to donate are explored. Two possible situations can occur: the person had registered as a 
donor, or more commonly, the person had not formally registered their wishes anywhere. 
Interestingly, donation wishes whether formally expressed or otherwise have no binding 
impact in the process; they do not foreclose the remaining pathways in the decision tree.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
In both situations the next of kin is asked to consent to organ donation on behalf of the 
individual. This conversation can end up in acceptance or refusal of organ donation. Again a 
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certain amount of indeterminacy prevails. In the UK, theoretically, families have no 
authority to overrule the wishes of an individual to donate in the event of their death. In 
practice, however, clinicians being obliged to engage in consultation with close family 
members, rarely ignore their objections (British Medical Association, 2012). The BMA 
ĨƌĂŵĞƐƚŚŝƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĚƵƚǇŽĨĐĂƌĞƚŽƚŚĞďĞƌĞĂǀĞĚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐ P ‘/ŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŽŶĚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
the face of their [relatives] strong and sustained opposition is likely to add to their distress 
as well as, potentially, generating public hostility towards organ donation. It is also 
questionable whether all individuals who sign up to the ODR would want their wishes 
followed if to do so would cause very significant adĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ? ?ritish 
Medical Association, 2012: 11-12). As noted earlier, consultation with the family is a fraught 
affair, its outcome dependent on many contingent factors of which ĚĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ ?Ɛprecise 
donation preferences is only one. 
Let us now interrogate in closer detail the programme theory underlying presumed consent, 
considering to what extent the underlying dynamic of Figure 3 is modified. Figure 4 
represents the logic map of the presumed consent programme as it is proposed for 
implementation in Wales (Welsh Government, 2013). This form of presumed consent, a soft 
opt-out, preserves the donor register and it also uses it to give people the opportunity to 
register their preference not to donate. In this figure, it is evident that the only discernible 
change from the previous logic map lies in the central spine, where individuals not wanting 
to consent can guide their relatives to that preference by formally expressing this wish. 
Inexorably, this pathway then joins all others in the  ‘family consultation ?ďŽǆ. A closer look 
through the microscope at these two systems thus reveals only a minor difference. 
Regardless of the type of legislation and of whether a deceased individual is registered as a 
donor (or as a non-donor), in most countries, Spain included (Matesanz and Miranda, 2002), 
families are allowed, one might say are expected, to have the last word. Steps in the 
donation process are not given but negotiated locally. Negotiations and tacit knowledge 
shape and reshape what actually happens in each system.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
II.  Mandated and Prompted Choice  
The current UK government casts a favourable eye (Hayes et al., 2012) on  ‘nudge 
interventions ? to prompt behavioural change in public health matters  W an approach 
popularised by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). The preference is for non-regulatory 
interventions designed influence behaviour by modifying the context in which people make 
choices. Close attention is thus paid to the  ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? of interventions and 
policies. One short chapter of their book explains how donor pools could be increased 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘mandatĞĚĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? interventions. As evidence, the authors refer to an online 
experiment with 161 respondents and a mandated choice programme on renewal of the 
driving licence implemented in Illinois that met with apparent success (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008: 184-192).  
Despite the broader evidence-ďĂƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨ ‘ŶƵĚŐĞƐ ? being questioned by a 
House of Lords enquiry (Science and Technology Select Committee, 2011), the coalition 
government set up a Behavioural Insights Team promoting choice re-architecture as the 
9 
 
Manzano & Pawson (2014- In Press- Journal of Health Organization & Management) 
 
solution to common public health issues (i.e. obesity, smoking, etc). Accordingly, 2011 saw 
the introduction in England of ĂƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? on the online application 
form for renewing and applying for driving licences. During this routine activity people were 
nudged into thinking about organ donation. Applicants are mandated to answer one 
question (with three pre-determined answers) about whether they would consider joining 
the donor register (See Box 1). This question already existed in the paper application form 
but now online applicants have no option but to complete it before they can continue with 
their application.  
[Box 1 around here] 
The programme theory is that, currently, many applicants for a driving licence either miss or 
ignore the organ donation question (prompted seemingly by the sentence included in the 
ƉĂƉĞƌĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ P ‘You do ŶŽŶĞĞĚƚŽĨŝůůŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?). These recalcitrants would now be 
forced to respond, prompting expectations of an instant rise in registration numbers. The 
largest source of people joining the UK Donor register is from drivers applying for a 
provisional driving licence (DVLA, 2006) and this younger population, moreover, are thought 
to prefer online registration.  
 
At the time of writing there was no published data on whether this architectural 
modification has led to significant increase in the donor pool. There are questions, however, 
about the elbow power and even the direction of the nudge described above. The possibility 
remains that citizens who were reluctant to answer questions in paper form may still opt for 
equivocation by clicking a box now labelled  ‘I do not wĂŶƚƚŽĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶŽǁ ?.  
Moreover, other experiences with mandated choice suggest mixed outcomes. An early 
experiment in Texas was counterproductive, with 80% of individuals refusing to designate 
themselves as organ donors with a concomitant reduction in organ procurement (Siminoff 
and Mercer, 2001) ?dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŝƐƚŚĂƚĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞŝƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
dispositions as well as their options. As Titmuss (1971) has taught us, ƚŚĞ ‘ŐŝĨƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ŝƐ
tenuous and precarious. It is possible that altruism can be stifled if it is nudged too hard. 
 
Such a possibility raises questions about how far specific choice architecture strategies do 
build around expectations of persuading the readily compliant, and about the prospects for 
targeted groups raising their guard in response. Certainly, nudges gain some of their appeal 
by presenting individuals as actors who may be easy to manipulate, or easy to persuade by 
creating the right environmental factors. The role of emotions and affective attitudes 
attached to organ donation are not generally approached by default architectural 
interventions. Possible registrees deal with the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŝĐŬĨĂĐƚŽƌ ? ?ĨĞĞůŝŶŐĚŝƐŐƵƐƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨŽƌŐĂŶĚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞũŝŶǆĨĂĐƚŽƌ ? ?ƚŚĞƐƵƉĞƌƐƚŝƚŝŽƵƐďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ
could lead to harm or death for the registrant), these being two of the most prominent 
instinctive reactions to registration (Morgan et al., 2008). How the ick and jinx factors are 
taken into account in policy designs is important. It is also important to consider whether 
registration attached to potentially dangerous activities can activate these feelings. 
 
Our main reservations about mandated choice, however, lie in our previous discussion on 
the complexity of the entire donation and transplantation system. To rely exclusively on 
interventions dealing with only one phase of the multiple processes described above ignores 
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the large number of other agents involved in the system, the connections amongst them, 
the institutional practices required to implement the system, and the cultural, legal and 
ethical forces that shape the entire system. Interventions directed at increasing organ 
donation registrations are preliminaries that impinge on our models only at stage four in 
Figure 1 and as side channel entering the flow diagram of figures 3/4 at the moment of 
 ‘ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌ ? ?ƐǁĞŚĂǀĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇdocumented, ƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐǁŝƐŚĞƐĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌ
followed automatically; they enter the process as one negotiable part of the complex and 
ever-present family confabulation ŽŶĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?/ƚĨŽůůŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƵƉƉůǇ ?Žƌ ‘ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?
solutions will always be moderated and generally speaking it may be said that organisational 
behaviour it is likely to play a bigger role than individual behaviour in increasing the 
operational organ donor pool. 
 
3. How to put complex systems to evaluation?  
 
Having established the endless complexity of the donation and transplantation system and 
the perils of some of simpler ideas on its transformation, we reach the ultimate question. 
How should such complex programmes be evaluated (Pawson, 2013) in a way that can 
contribute to their improvement (Berwick, 2008)? .The solutions raised in this section 
should be regarded as tentative; indeed they are work-in-progress, currently being pursued 
in a range of pilot inquiries and scoping studies.  
The literature on deceased organ donation tends to approach this topic from different 
perspectives biomedical (outcomes) and ethnographic (meanings and emotions). Theory-
based evaluation is presented here as an alternative to these method-driven approaches, 
making two further suggestions: i) modelling micro-processes, and ii) comparative case 
study designs.  
I. Modelling micro processes 
 
A key feature of the programme theory approach is that it allows inspection of the 
implementation process to drill down from macro to meso to micro levels (Funnell and 
Rogers, 2011). A macro model such as Figure 1 allows inspection of the integrity of the 
entire implementation chain and permits the identification of the strategic flows and 
blockages. It is equally possible to narrow focus to any step in the chain and use a logic 
model to explore the delivery of component process. As an example of how micro processes 
can be modelled, we take the family interview, one of the key phases of obtaining consent 
to deceased organ donation for transplantation, with some identifying it as the stage at 
which most potential donors are lost. It is our families who have the power to make the 
ultimate decision of whether to grant the ultimate gift of recyclable organs. It is their 
altruism and not ours that is the key element here. Their views on body integrity, their 
understanding of death, their relationship with healthcare staff are all at stake and this is 
the point in the process where they come to the fore. 
The research literature abounds with tentative hypotheses on factors that may influence a 
ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐŝŶĐůŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ to agree or decline donation  W  donor and next-of-kin factors, request 
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timing, requestor characteristics, prior knowledge and opinions about organ donation, 
numbers making the decision, communication processes and satisfaction with the 
healthcare team, ethnicity, and so on (Simpkin et al., 2009; Simoff et al., 2011). Practical 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘family ? can add further ambiguity here since family composition (nuclear and 
extended families, etc) and patterns of proximity of residence affect how rapidly the next of 
kin can be located for consultation purposes. Any single member of the family in the 
interview room (no matter how distant) disagreeing with donation could be a potential 
barrier to donation. The stakes are unusually high in these interviews, relatives being 
decision-makers rather than opinion-bearers.  
Even in this specific encounter complexity skyrockets and a strategy is needed to prioritise 
evaluation on the key issues. One method is to concentrate on process and we illustrate this 
ǁŝƚŚĂƚĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŵĂƉ ? as in Figure 5. Interviews with relatives of potential donors 
are normally carried out by dedicated transplant coordinators. What happens at this stage is 
basically a delicate process of family counselling and support. There are many existing 
models of the counselling function which suggest that clients are best accommodated by 
ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŽĐŽŵĞƚŽƚĞƌŵƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ŝŶ ĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ (Kübler-Ross, 
1969). In the  ‘consent interview ? this process of adaptation has to occur in a highly 
compressed sequence. The point, once again, is that it is a procedure that can be planned, 
mapped, investigated and improved. 
The process can be modelled (with the usual provisos about simplification) in five phases: a) 
gathering information about the family; b) managing the interview and its setting; c) setting 
up and explaining death; d) explaining the consent process e) handling queries and 
apprehensions. When specifically trained coordinators have full responsibility for the 
donation process, our initial observations suggest that a range of persuasive strategies are 
activated in order to manage these stages at a time when families are going through an 
ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůƐŚŽĐŬ ?/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐƚŽĐĂůůƚŚĞŵ ‘ƚƌŝĐŬƐŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂĚĞ ?ďƵƚŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ
noted that they are found in all interviews on sensitive topics with vulnerable subjects 
(Liamputtong, 2007). 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Detailed examination of these processes would be carried out using the normal methods of 
process inquiry  W interviews and focus groups with transplant coordinators, close 
observation of the interviews, debriefing and respondent validation. The methodological 
point is that the programme theory provides the point of entry, allowing the researcher to 
use the model to elaborate which strategies work for whom in what circumstances. This will 
help us to map the effectiveness of various modes of interpersonal influence.  Persuasion 
comes in many forms: At stage a) the donation team gather information about family 
composition and dynamics, the emotional impact of the type of death (accidental, sudden, 
expected) and their implicit or explicit views on donation; all these factors will influence the 
strategies to employ. At stage b) techniques to manage the setting relate with choosing 
interview room and suggesting which family members should attend the interview and what 
staff will perform it (transplant coordinator alone, with clinician, etc). The third phase is the 
official start of the interview. Death is communicated and emotions are comforted. Only 
when irreversibility is understood, the communicators should proceed to the fourth stage. 
Consent to donation is explained ĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ
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follow. Gómez and de Santiago (2008: 113-114) describing the interview model used in 
Alicante (Spain) explain how they offer arguments pro-donation by invoking feelings of 
altruism (appealing to social, group and individual needs), utilitarian arguments 
 ? ‘unfortunately, ŚĞ ?ƐŚĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŶĞĞĚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶƐĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ? ? and those of gratification and 
ŐůŽƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŽŶŽƌǀĂůƵĞƐ ? “/ďĞƚŚĞ ?ƐŚĞǁĂƐĂŐĞŶĞƌŽƵƐƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŚŽŚĞůƉĞĚŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐ
ĂŶĚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?. In the last stage, queries and apprehensions are handled. Answering fears 
about body integrity and funeral practicalities and correction of myths or wrongly held 
beliefs which can lead for instance to joint interview with spiritual leaders. In some 
countries funeral expenses are partially or totally funded for donors and this pragmatic 
argument will also be presented to relatives. 
An understanding of what works for whom and how many of these stratagems and in what 
circumstances are put in place elucidates contextual factors that will guide researchers 
through possible explanations. Whilst we lack reliable data to make sound comparisons on 
the effectiveness of the consent interview it is clear that there is variation here, with for 
instance Caballero et al.(2012b) reporting a 100 % (N=40) success rate in consent interviews 
in a Spanish hospital during a period of 20 months in 2011-2012. Without assuming that 
such levels of performance are sustainable or tranferrable, they do indicate the need for 
precise explantions about what might fire and misfire in a consultation. The point is (again) 
that without the orientation provided by the logic maps previously illustrated, the search for 
 ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ǁŝůůƌĞŵĂŝŶƵŶĨŽĐƵƐƐĞĚĂŶĚĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇ.- 
II. Comparative Case Studies 
 
Our second suggestion for coming to a better understanding of the inner workings and 
outworkings of complex systems is to engage in a programme of comparative case studies. 
^ǁĂŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ (1971) ŵĂǆŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŝƐƵŶƚŚŝŶŬĂďůĞ ?probably applies 
to all research but leaves us far short of the optimal design for designing a study to 
understand the contrasting fortunes of different organ donation regimes.  
ƵƐĞĨƵůƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƚĂŬĞƐƵƐƌŝŐŚƚďĂĐŬƚŽ:ŽŚŶ^ƚƵĂƌƚDŝůů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘method of difference ? 
in which he recommended examining systems with markedly different outcomes and then 
tracing though their inputs to find the crucial variable that distinguished between them. It is 
quite possible to begin here and we will pursue this illustration by returning to the  ‘league 
tables ? and using an example a potential comparison between the Spanish and the UK 
regimes. These offer a simple orientation that accommodates Dŝůů ?ƐŝĚĞĂŽĨŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐĂƚ
ƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨ ‘ŵĂǆŝŵƵŵĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?. But how can we uncover the key factors that may account 
for outcome heterogeneity? As we have already seen, not only are there a multiplicity of 
sub-processes in respect of which the two regimes might differ but, crucially, the success of 
the process depends on their multiplicative action. In other words we are unlikely to find a 
ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ‘ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵs differ; rather the explanatory mechanism is 
likely to lie in the interconnection and co-ordination of sub-processes with each system. 
dŽĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞƚŚŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇĂŵĞƚŚŽĚŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚƌĂĐŝŶŐ ?
has evolved in the comparative and historical social sciences (George and Bennett, 2005) 
and what follows is an attempt to adapt the idea to the study of healthcare organisations. 
The starting point once again is the programme theory. Any intervention, programme or 
service has an implementation chain, which can be rendered as a logic model describing the 
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stepping stones required to convert the inputs within a system into outputs. Figure 6 (upper 
section) depicts in an entirely abstract fashion an input-outcome conversion process that 
will apply to any system. No intervention achieves it aim in one fell swoop and in general it 
is possible to map the multifarious activities than convert inputs into outputs and then 
further down the chain onto immediate, intermediate and final outcomes. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
We have already produced such a model of the donation to transplanting pathway and this 
abstract map may act as a baseline for empirical research in the manner depicted in the 
further stages of Figure 6. We know that in any real system that the programme theories 
will always be achieved imperfectly. Such systems can never be reproduced exactly. Any 
transplantation regime will face uncertainty, ambivalence or resistance, it will generate 
unintended consequences, other priorities and programmes will intervene. The purpose of 
the empirical analysis is thus to inspect the fidelity of the hypothesised implementation 
chain in order to uncover its  ‘flows ?,  ‘blockages ? and  ‘leakages ?. Under the guidance of 
abstract template it is possible to trace the process through in each case study, comparing 
like-point with like-point and thus charting with some precision the stages at which the 
execution differs (a scenario depicted in the abstract in the lower sections of Figure 5). The 
idea to construct explanations of why conversion from, say, point D to E differs between the 
systems and, in so doing, to ascertain transferable lessons on system improvement. 
This is the design that is under construction in our present work and we posses only 
candidate theories on the crucial contexts and mechanisms that differentiate between 
systems. We illustrate the process with a preliminary example that sits right at the 
beginning of the process (steps 1 and 2 in Figure 1): the need to improve the detection of 
potential donors. The programme theory is that organ donation is low because few eligible 
patients are approached and asked. A key outcome measure used in international 
comparisons is  ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƌĂƚĞ ? ?ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂĐƚƵĂůĚŽŶŽƌƐĂƐĂƉĞƌĐ ŶƚĂŐĞof the 
potential donor pool) and therefore, iĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĚŽŶŽƌƉŽŽů ?ŝƐƚŚĞŬĞǇŝƐƐƵĞ. 
In Spain transplant coordinators -who are physicians with special interest in donation and 
transplantation- screen through intensive care medical histories for possible donors. Their 
UK equivalents  Wwho are nurses with special interest in donation- tend to rely on referrals 
from emergency staff not always knowledgeable about the increasingly flexible  criteria for 
potential donors  (Pont Castellana et al., 2008), and who could potentially be perceived as 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂĐŽŶŇŝĐƚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ when deciding to withdraw treatment (McMaster and Vadeyar, 
2000). Power issues affecting nurse-physician relationships and end-of-life strategies in 
emergency rooms (Bailey et al., 2011) enter the UK donation scene. With little availability of 
intensive care beds, a plausible hypothesis is that in the UK, patients with hopeless 
prognosis are not prioritised for admission. Moreover, withdrawal of treatments that are no 
longer beneficial may occur sooner than in countries with greater critical care capacity 
(Manara et al., 2012).  What can be seen from this vignette ŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƚĂŐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?
ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶ ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?ŽŶŽƌŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŽŶŝƐĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚďǇ the co-presence of a 
range of structures, procedure, and historical practices. And this brings us to a final 
consideration on donation and transplantation policy  W namely to beware of one-size-fits-all 
solutions for the service. 
14 
 
Manzano & Pawson (2014- In Press- Journal of Health Organization & Management) 
 
In 2010, a European Union directive aimed at achieving uniform quality and safety standards 
and improving waiting times for transplants gave to Spain (Watson, 2010) the role of 
improving the training of transplant coordinators. In the same year, the World Health 
Organization recommended reproduction of the Spanish model of organ donation 
worldwide assuming that self sufficiency in the supply of organs will follow and that the 
universal trend of organ trade and trafficking will therefore be reduced (WHO, 2011). Such 
initiatives are entirely consonant with the current institutional drive for international policy 
transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). In rapidly changing policy environments governments 
often look for ready-made policy solutions, presented as panaceas.  
But is such direct transfer possible in complex adaptive systems? Is a transplantation regime 
transplantable? What exactly is supposed to be transferable? Key factors identified as the 
active ingredients of the so-called Spanish model are: a) independent transplant 
coordination teams; b) hospital reimbursement policies, which compensates hospitals for 
organ procurement costs; and c) a multi-layered network at the national, regional, and 
hospital level, which coordinates and manages activities (Matesanz and Domínguez-Gil, 
2007). As we have shown, it is far from clear why these factors are singled out, and, more 
significantly, we have demonstrated that it is not it the ingredients per se that bring about 
improvement. What is important is how the macro, meso, and micro ingredients are 
combined and blended, and whether the existing structures and staff relationships allow for 
that integration. Even within the Spanish system one would expect the requisite 
configurations to vary between regions and certainly between hospitals with or without 
neuro-surgery departments (Matesanz et al., 2012) or transplant units (Velasco et al., 2010). 
Hospitals with transplant units keep for themselves the organs that can be transplanted in 
their institutions unless there is a national emergency, while hospitals which only generate 
organs are confronted with increased logistic difficulties at no tangible benefit for the 
institution. Indeed, a recent study published in the Lancet (Rodriguez-Arias et al., 2010) 
exposed some of the less publicised challenges of the Spanish procurement system. 
Coming to cross national comparisons, one can say that these contextual constraints are 
even more pronounced. The real purpose of comparative case studies, therefore, is to 
produce explanations for differences in inputs, outcomes and outputs. The aim to discover 
 ‘what works for whom in what circumstances and in what respects and why ? (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997). The same innovation can stifle or improve, depending on context, and it thus 
important to have some understanding of system interdependencies (Batalden and 
Davidoff, 2007). 
Conclusion 
 
The importance and urgency of all service reform is often marked with the use of metaphors 
about life and death situations. In the case of organ donation this is literally the case  W body 
parts from brain dead patients with beating hearts are removed in the hope of prolonging 
the life of another human being. Hundreds of people are involved in this single transaction. 
Inevitably, their interpretations and practices vary widely. Unequivocally, the consequence is 
substantial diversity in transplantation outcomes. The beating heart of the donation process 
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is the organisation. We have attempted to show how death and life depends on the 
accumulation of series of embedded, institutional sub-processes.  
Evaluations need to be concerned with this whole system rather than with its discrete parts 
or sectors. A change to any element will bring about an anticipated effect only if it is 
absorbed and supported by the remainder of the system. We have argued that this daunting 
predicament can be confronted by the incorporation of a theory of system change as an 
initial step in policy development and evaluation. The great advantage is that that this 
strategy poses the self-same question  W dear policy innovator, will your newfangled idea be 
absorbed, supported and promoted within the well-worn systems and structures into which 
it is pitched? 
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Figure 4 
Logic Map of Presumed Consent
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6: Comparative Process Tracing 
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Box 1 
Box 1: The English driving licence prompted choice programme 
 
Driving licence online applicants have to tick one of three options below to answer 
a question on organ donation before they can complete their application: 
 ?zĞƐ ?/ǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌ 
 ?/ĚŽŶŽƚǁŝƐŚƚŽĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶŽǁ ?Žƌ 
 ?/ĂŵĂůƌĞĂĚǇƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞE,^KƌŐan Donor Register. 
 
